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Abstract
ANARFI DANIEL, NERUDOVÁ DANUŠE. 2018. Profit Shifting and the Tax Response of 
Multinational Banks in Eastern Europe.  Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae 
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The aim of the paper is to measure the amount of profit shifting within the banking sector in 
Eastern European countries. The paper uses firm‑level bank data from the Bankscope database of 
multinational subsidiary banks operating in Eastern Europe for a period of 10 years (2006 – 2015). 
An empirical analysis is performed on the panel data to identify the profit‑shifting activities of these 
banks. Focusing on the banking sector of Eastern European countries, which are a microcosm of 
the European Union, substantial evidence of profit shifting is found and confirms that banks have 
enhanced tax‑planning opportunities similar to firms from different jurisdictions. The paper also 
seeks to contribute to recommendations on how fair and sustainable taxation and social policy 
reforms can increase the economic stability of the EU member states. 
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INTRODUCTION
The debate on base erosion and profit‑shifting 
activities undertaken by multinational corporations 
(MNCs) is continuing unabated in the public 
domain, as heads of states, developmental 
organizations, and the international media have 
in recent times raised many concerns about 
the growing activities of aggressive tax planning. 
The debate has recently been stirred up by 
the unprecedented leak of approximately 11.5 
million documents, the “Panama Papers”, from 
the database of the offshore law firm Mossack 
Fonseca, spanning the period from the 1970s 
to spring 2016. The Panama Papers basically 
expose how some of the world’s leaders and most 
influential people have allegedly used offshore 
accounts and “shell companies” to avoid paying 
taxes. Multinational companies, such as Apple, 
Google, and Starbucks, have also come under heavy 
criticism recently with regard to their considerable 
involvement in profit shifting and aggressive tax 
planning, especially in relation to their British 
sales, based on anecdotal evidence.
The financial crisis in 2008 and the colossal 
amount of public money invested to stabilize 
the financial sector caused huge pressure on 
the national budgets, therefore attracting increasing 
attention to the collection of taxes and fiscal strains 
in many countries, especially among MNCs and 
the financial sector. This point to the fact that 
companies set up complicated tax structures to 
indulge in aggressive tax‑planning practices to shift 
income from high‑tax to low‑tax locations. When 
MNCs engage in tax planning, the possible motive is 
to shift profits to erode the taxable base to locations 
where they are subject to more favourable tax 
treatment (OECD, 2013).
In response to the need for a solution to this 
problem, several initiatives, collaborations, and 
developments have been undertaken by world 
leaders and various organizations. In May 2012 
for instance, the G‑20 leaders held a meeting in 
Mexico to reiterate the need to prevent base erosion 
and profit‑shifting (BEPS) activities by MNCs. 
At the meeting the world leaders affirmed their 
decision to follow closely the concrete 15‑action 
plan to tackle BEPS by the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
730 Daniel Anarfi, Danuse Nerudova 
which was later produced in July 2013 and the final 
reports presented in October 2015. Dharmapala 
(2014) alluded to the fact that the 15‑item action 
plan that was released by the OECD is intended 
to facilitate multilateral cooperation among 
governments with regard to the taxation of MNCs. 
Furthermore, a joint task force initiative has been 
introduced by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the Organisation for Economic Co‑operation 
and Development (OECD), the UN Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), and the World 
Bank Group. This Platform for Collaboration on Tax 
has purposely been tasked to produce measures 
to support developing countries in combatting 
BEPS with respect to sharing information, building 
capacity, and delivering guidance, among others. Very 
recently, in October 2016, the European Commission 
also announced new reforms in corporate tax‑ and 
BEPS‑related activities. The reforms consist of three 
separate measures: (1) a two‑stage proposal towards 
a common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB); 
(2) a directive on double taxation dispute resolution 
mechanisms in the EU; and (3) amendments to 
the Anti‑Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD) relating to 
hybrid mismatches with third countries.
The extant literature on international tax 
planning has largely provided ample evidence 
of BEPS and aggressive tax planning in different 
jurisdictions (Buettner and Wamser, 2013; 
Crivelli et al., 2016; Finke, 2013; Huizinga and 
Laeven, 2008; Weichenrieder, 2009). Research on 
the profit‑shifting activities of MNCs has mostly 
been associated with the non‑financial industry 
(Clausing, 2016; Haufler and Schjelderup, 2000; 
Hines and Rice, 1994; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008; 
Krautheim and Schmidt‑Eisenlohr, 2011). A few 
studies have also been conducted in the area of 
tax effects on capital structures. For instance, 
Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004) analysed the capital 
structures of foreign affiliates and the internal 
capital markets of multinational corporations. They 
found that 10 % higher local tax rates are associated 
with 2.8 % higher debt / asset ratios, with internal 
borrowing being particularly sensitive to taxes. 
Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicodeme (2008) also found 
that a foreign subsidiary’s capital structure reflects 
the local corporate tax rates as well as the tax rate 
differences vis‑à‑vis the parent firm and other 
foreign subsidiaries. They therefore suggested that 
ignoring the international debt shifting arising from 
differences in national tax rates would understate 
the impact of national taxes on debt policies by 
about 25 %. However, the financial sector has fallen 
short and has seen few studies on this evidence. 
Demirgüc‑Kunt and Huizinga (2001) examined 
the taxation of domestic and foreign‑owned 
banks as well as conducting an investigation into 
whether domestic and foreign banks pay different 
amounts of domestic tax. Their study revealed that 
the taxes paid by foreign banks are shown to raise 
relatively little with the local statutory tax. Merz 
and Overesch (2016) also examined multinational 
banks’ response to taxation. Using firm‑level bank 
data, the authors found significant tax effects of 
profit shifting on the reported profits of bank 
subsidiaries, but the consequences reduced after 
the financial crisis in 2008.
The need to examine the profit‑shifting 
activities of MNCs in the banking sector is further 
strengthened by the evidence found by Merz 
and Overesch (2016) suggesting that banks have 
enhanced tax‑planning opportunities, similar to 
firms from the IT industry or the retailing sector. 
The aim of the paper is therefore to measure 
the amount of profit shifting within the banking 
sector in Eastern European countries. Specifically, 
the study examines the effect of multinational 
banks taking advantage of the differential rate in 
corporate tax of the host countries, particularly 
due to different business models. For the purpose 
of this study, we use a micro‑level panel database 
of 45 subsidiary multinational banks from 14 
countries in Eastern Europe as defined in Amadeus 
over a period of 10 years. The countries under 
consideration are Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Serbia, 
Slovakia, and Ukraine.
Literature Review
The theoretical underpinnings of the estimation 
of BEPS can be explained by the “Hines‑Rice” (HR) 
approach, which stem from Hines and Rice (1994). 
According to Dharmapala (2014), the HR approach 
operates on the premise that the observed pre‑tax 
income of a subsidiary firm constitutes the sum of 
“true” income and “shifted” income. True income 
is derived by the subsidiary firm using capital and 
labour inputs. Shifted income, on the other hand, is 
the measure of the tax rate differential between two 
subsidiaries, which is the incentive to move profit 
in or out of a subsidiary. The HR approach largely 
focuses on the semi‑elasticity of the tax differences, 
which represents the percentage change in pre‑tax 
income associated with a 1 percentage point 
change in the tax rate (Dharmapala, 2014). Since 
its introduction the HR approach has been widely 
used by several authors and the magnitude of BEPS 
found has been enormous and varied. 
To start with Huizinga and Laeven (2008) 
used a unique data set that contains detailed 
firm‑level information on the parent companies 
and subsidiaries of European multinationals and 
detailed information about the international tax 
system to test and examine empirically the extent 
of intra‑European profit shifting by European 
multinationals. The authors considered profit 
shifting arising not only from the international tax 
differences between affiliates and parent companies 
but also from the tax differences between affiliates 
in different host countries. Their finding was 
semi‑elasticity of reported profits with respect to 
the top statutory tax rate of 1.43, while shifting costs 
were estimated to be 1.6 % of the tax base. 
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In 2009 a 10 percentage point increase in 
the parent’s home country tax rate, leading 
to roughly half a percentage point increase in 
profitability, was the BEPS evidence found by 
Weichenrieder (2009). The author considered 
profit‑shifting behaviour in the EU using data on 
German inbound and outbound FDI. The study 
also found an empirical correlation between 
the home country tax rate of a parent and the net 
tax profitability of its German affiliate, which is 
consistent with profit‑shifting behaviour.
Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) also predicted 
tax semi‑elasticity of subsidiary pre‑tax profits of 
about 0.8 using the meta‑regression approach to 
identify estimates from 25 studies and the existing 
literature. The authors estimated the tax response 
through financial planning from the transfer pricing 
and licensing channel, and their results suggest that 
transfer pricing and licensing are the dominant 
profit‑shifting channel.  
The use of panel data and affiliate fixed effects in 
estimating BEPS has also been considered extensively. 
Dischinger (2010) used a large micro database of 
European MNEs that includes detailed accounting 
and ownership information (AMADEUS) to provide 
indirect empirical evidence of profit‑shifting 
behaviour by multinational enterprises (MNEs), 
employing a panel study for the years 1995 to 2005 
while controlling for unobservable fixed firm effects. 
The study also found that a 10 percentage point 
decrease in the tax rate of the affiliate increases its 
pre‑tax profitability by 7 %. 
Lohse and Riedel (2013) also used panel data 
from Amadeus to investigate empirically whether 
national tax laws implemented by transfer‑pricing 
legislation, which is intended to limit the leeway 
of multinational firms to exploit international 
corporate tax rate differences and relocate 
profit to low‑tax affiliates, are instrumental in 
restricting shifting behaviour. The study found 
semi‑elasticity of about 0.4 and further suggested 
that transfer‑pricing rules significantly reduce 
shifting activities.
The role of internal debt as a vehicle for shifting 
profits to low‑tax countries was also explored by 
Buettner and Wamser (2013). Using data on German 
multinationals, their study exploited the differential 
tax rate in more than 100 countries over 10 years. 
The results established that internal debt is used 
more by multinationals with affiliates in low‑tax 
countries and increases with the spread between 
the host‑country tax rate and the lowest tax rate 
among all the affiliates. However, because the tax 
effects found in the study were small, the authors 
suggested that profit shifting by means of internal 
debt is rather unimportant for German firms. 
In the banking sector, firm‑level bank data from 
the Bankscope database were used by Merz and 
Overesch (2016) to analyse how multinational 
banks respond to taxation. The authors found 
significant tax effects on the reported profits 
of bank subsidiaries and that the magnitude 
of the tax response of the reported profits was 
double the effects found in previous studies for 
non‑financial MNCs. Our aim, particularly for this 
paper, is to focus our attention on Eastern Europe, 
which is a microcosm of the European Union, and 
to estimate the magnitude of BEPS undertaken by 
multinational bank subsidiaries. 
Langenmayr and Reiter in 2017 used a novel 
and bank‑specific method of profit shifting thus 
the strategic relocation of proprietary trading 
to low‑tax jurisdictions to show how banks 
shift profits to low‑tax countries. They used 
a regulatory data from the German central bank 
and the results showed that a one percentage 
point lower corporate tax rate increases banks’ 
proprietary fixed‑income trading assets by 2.2 % 
and trading derivatives by 6.3 %.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
This study measure the amount of profit shifting 
within the banking sector in Eastern European 
countries. 
Data Description 
For the purpose of this study, we collected 
comprehensive bank data from the Bankscope 
Database compiled by Bureau Van Dijk for 14 
countries in Eastern Europe. We use a data set of 
45 foreign subsidiary banks over a period of 10 
years from 2006 to 2015, yielding a total of 450 
year‑bank observations. A subsidiary bank is 
defined in this study as a bank in which at least 50 % 
of the shares are owned and controlled by the parent 
company. Banks that have negative earnings before 
tax are excluded from the database, because we 
want to consider profit‑making companies that 
have the motivation to shift or receive profits 
from different subsidiaries. We only consider 
private commercial banks; therefore, we exclude 
central banks, specialized governmental credit 
institutions and micro‑finance institutions, and 
banks with insufficient tax information from our 
data compilation. Although this paper aims to 
achieve it’s objective, the limitation of the study is 
that the research was uniquely conducted on a small 
sample of population compared to previous studies. 
Model Construction
A few studies have used transfer pricing and 
estimations of deviation from arm’s‑length prices to 
find evidence of profit shifting (Bernard, Jensen,  and 
Schott, 2006; Clausing, 2003; Swenson, 2001). Other 
previous studies have also dealt extensively with tax 
planning and profit shifting in industries other than 
the financial industry (Bagwell  and Staiger, 2012; 
Dischinger, Knoll,  and Riedel, 2014; Maffini  and 
Mokkas, 2011; Peralta, Wauthy,  and Van Ypersele, 
2006). This study, however, investigates whether 
multinational banks take advantage of the corporate 
tax differentials among subsidiaries by focusing 
on the financial sector in Eastern Europe, which 
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is a microcosm of the European Union, unlike 
previous studies in which large data sets have been 
used across the globe. The Hines–Rice approach 
(the HR approach) has been referred to as the most 
frequently used model in the estimation of profit 
shifting. According to Dharmapala (2014), the basis 
for this approach is that the unobserved profit 
before tax (PBT) of subsidiary i at time represents 
the sum of “true” profit and “shifted” profit (where 
the latter can be either positive or negative). 
The firm theory assumes that capital and labour 
inputs are used to generate true profit. Following 
the work of Merz and Overesch (2016) and other 
previous studies, we use the common estimation 
shown below in this study.
0 1 2it it it it it t it itPBT KAP LAB Xα α τ α ρ φ ε= + + + + + + + 
0 1 2it it it it it t it itPBT KAP LAB Xα α τ α ρ φ ε= + + + + + + +  (1)
As indicated earlier, the capital (KAP) and 
labour (LAB) inputs are included to predict 
the counterfactual “true” profit. Dischinger (2010) 
provided a contrary view that the inclusion of 
labour and capital does not significantly affect 
the coefficient estimate of the tax differential. Xit 
is a vector of additional subsidiary‑level control 
characteristics. The coefficient of interest, α1, is used 
to identify the shifted profit and the tax incentive to 
move profit in or out of the subsidiary. Therefore, we 
expect α1 < 0 to obtain an indirect evidence of profit 
shifting, which is tax semi‑elasticity of the reported 
profits. Variables ρt and φ represent the control for 
heterogeneity across banks by a bank‑specific effect 
and random term, respectively. εi is the error term, 
and α1 is the constant.
Variable Description
This study follows the previous literature in using 
earnings before taxes (PBT, in logs) of the bank 
subsidiary as its dependent variable. The work of 
Merz and Overesch (2016) is followed by applying 
other variables, such as net interest revenue, 
non‑interest operating income, and revenue from 
net fees and commissions as additional dependent 
variables to conduct a test on the differences in 
the tax response across different business models. 
Again the loan loss provisions (LLPs) and the total 
debt‑to‑total assets ratios (LEVERAGE) are used. 
To control for bank characteristics, the variable 
KAPit defines subsidiary i’s capital inputs (a proxy 
by total assets), and LABit defines subsidiary i’s 
labour inputs (proxied for instance by employment 
compensation). The off‑balance sheet (OBS) items 
are the variable used to capture the subsidiary 
banks’ activities that do not appear on the balance 
sheet. Additional bank‑level variables include 
earning assets to total assets (EATA), which 
captures banks’ assets used to generate interest 
income, and GROWTH (the annual change in 
the total assets of banks). We also follow the work of 
Gropp and Heider (2010) and Merz and Overesch 
(2016) and use total securities, T‑Bills, and other 
bills as banks’ COLLATERAL; PROF is used as 
a profitability measure defined as net income 
with interest expenses / total assets; and PIOP, 
which is the pre‑impairment operating profits, is 
used to control for profitability before loan loss 
provisioning (Merz and Overesch, 2016).
The tax variable used is the statutory corporate 
tax rate (CTR) of the bank subsidiary’s host country. 
This is the incentive to shift taxable profits to and 
from the subsidiary banks. Merz and Overesch 
(2016) asserted that there is a need to include 
the average tax rate (ATAX) within the multinational 
banking group of which the subsidiary bank 
in question is excluded. This is to account for 
the incentives existing within the multinational 
bank, and a positive coefficient is expected. 
MTAX is the minimum tax rate that exists within 
the multinational group and is used to indicate 
a lower incentive to shift profits. We assume that 
the entire countries under consideration use 
uniform transfer‑pricing rules and a common 
rule of law. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This section presents the regression results of 
the impact of tax on the reported profits of our 
multinational subsidiaries in the banking sector.
Effect of Tax on Reported Profits
The table below is used to start our analysis of 
the impact of tax on reported profits using (ln) 
PBT as the dependent variable. We first perform 
a random‑effect panel analysis for the period 
2006 – 2015. Our basis for finding evidence of profit 
shifting, as used in the literature, is that we expect 
the coefficient α1 < 0. 
From our regression results, a negative 
coefficient is found but no significant effect of 
the host country tax rate on the reported profits. 
Although the evidence found is not significant, 
it seems to suggest that bank subsidiaries with 
higher tax in host countries have smaller pre‑tax 
profit and confirms our argument regarding how 
multinational banks respond to taxes with their 
reported profits in host countries. The coefficient 
of the variable CTR, yielding the result of 1.106, 
suggests that every 1 percentage point increase in 
the host country tax rate is associated with about 
1.1 % lower reported profits of a bank subsidiary.
This estimated result, which shows evidence of 
profit shifting, confirms the findings of previous 
studies. For instance, Merz and Overesch (2016) 
also found evidence of semi‑elasticity of –2.378 
in the banking industry. Our results also confirm 
the results of Dischinger (2010) and Huizinga 
and Laeven (2008), which provided evidence of 
profit shifting in other jurisdictions. The ATAX 
and MTAX are included in columns (3) and (4), 
for which a positive coefficient is expected but 
the opposite is obtained. 
 Profit Shifting and the Tax Response of Multinational Banks in Eastern Europe 733
I: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std Dev. Min. Max.
PBT 391 11.10092 1.546734 7.1108 13.9402
NTR 388 11.95256 1.296197 8.9984 14.4986
NTOI 387 11.25805 1.430045 7.9442 13.7569
NFC 383 10.84213 1.563599 5.8833 13.5842
LLP 354 10.22086 1.579326 4.9174 13.2073
LEVERAGE 391 0.883307 0.047674 0.703054 0.968829
KAP 391 15.3749 1.349472 11.2554 17.9563
EATA 391 0.885053 0.074826 0.570137 0.98833
OBS 328 13.638 1.932473 6.6464 19.0232
LAB 364 10.92436 1.331966 8.21207 13.38682
PIOP 388 11.55732 1.415149 8.21207 14.32922
PROF 386 0.036898 0.018185 –0.00518 0.135338
GROWTH 379 0.106862 0.175521 –0.5294 1.160414
COLLATERAL 154 7.745943 1.829954 2.423527 12.23984
CTR 449 0.174653 0.043538 0 0.25
ATAX 450 0.183815 0.053031 0 0.254182
MTAX 450 0.167076 0.057193 0 0.25
Source: Authors’ estimations
II: Banks’ Profit Shifting
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PBT PBT PBT PBT
CTR
–1.106 –0.693 0.253 0.0582
(–0.54) (‑0.39) –0.08 –0.02
KAP
0.228 0.929*** 0.907** 0.914** 
–0.81 –3.35 –3.17 –3.18
EATA
0.314 1.756 1.835 1.894
–0.28 –1.78 –1.83 –1.86
OBS
0.0975 –0.0196 –0.0208 –0.0142
–1.25 (–0.28) (–0.30) (–0.20)
LAB
0.766** 0.239 0.268 0.25
–2.78 –0.95 –1.02 –0.93
GROWTH
0.904 1.460** 1.462** 1.455** 
–1.77 –2.89 –2.89 –2.86
COLLATERAL
–0.0754* –0.0766* –0.0747* –0.0745*  
(–2.09) (–2.29) (–2.20) (–2.19)
LEVERAGE
–10.03*** –9.848*** –9.876***
(–5.44) (–5.11) (–5.12)   
ATAX
–1.119 –0.342
(–0.38) (–0.09)   
MTAX
–0.768
(–0.34)   
_CONS
–1.637 2.27 2.11 2.095
(–1.08) –1.63 –1.45 –1.44
N 139 139 139 139
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Income from Different Business Models
In this section we test the tax response of 
multinational banks using income from other 
business as our dependent variable, instead of lnPBT, 
as suggested by Merz and Overesch (2016). The net 
interest revenue, non‑interest operating income, net 
fees, and commission are used in our analysis. 
The results presented in the above table provide 
evidence of multinational subsidiary banks’ 
response to taxes using income from different 
models. Column (1) presents evidence of profit 
shifting with net interest revenue as the dependent 
variable. In this column we find insignificant 
evidence of profit shifting with semi‑elasticity of 
0.173. In column (2) we use another dependent 
variable, which is the non‑interest revenue, 
for which similar evidence is found but is not 
significant.
Moving to column (3), the net fees and commission 
are used as the dependent variable to seek evidence 
of profit shifting from other income sources. 
The result in the above table is a significant negative 
coefficient. Merz and Overesch (2016) suggested 
that such evidence means that shifting profits to 
low‑tax subsidiaries seems to be rather easy.
Loan Loss Provisions
This section investigates the relationship that 
exists between the loan loss provision variable and 
the CTR. 
The basis for our argument is that we expect 
a positive correlation between the CTR and 
the LLPs. The above table shows the results, 
in which the loan loss provision is used as 
the dependent variable. Although we do not achieve 
the expected results, in column (2) we include 
the pre‑impairment operating profits, which we 
expect to have a positive impact on the LLPs. It can 
be seen from the results that a highly significant 
positive coefficient is recorded. This seems to 
suggest that banks with higher pre‑impairment 
operating profits accumulate LLPs for future losses 
as well as means to reduce their tax base.
CONCLUSION
The aim of this paper was to measure the amount of profit shifting within the banking sector, 
particularly in Eastern European countries. International taxation and multinational tax planning 
have attracted public and political attention for some time now due to their adverse effect on 
countries’ public purse. In this study we use a data set from the Bankscope Database compiled by 
Bureau Van Dijk of 14 countries in Eastern Europe. The approach and method of previous studies 
are followed and we regress the panel data set for the period of 2006–2015. For the purposes of our 
analysis, we define a subsidiary bank as having at least 50 % of its shares owned and controlled by 
the parent company.
Our results show that multinational banks’ subsidiaries reported an earnings response to the host 
country’s tax incentives. In comparison with previous studies, the magnitude of the tax sensitivity of 
the evidence found is substantial. Using income from different models in an additional analysis, we 
find evidence of the banks using net fees and commission to respond to tax. We perform another task 
using loan loss provisions, but our results do not agree with the previous findings; however, including 
pre‑impairment operating profits in the model suggests that banks with higher PIOPs accumulate 
LLPs for future losses as well as means to reduce their tax base. 
The results obtained in this study confirm that banks have enhanced tax‑planning opportunities 
similar to firms from different jurisdictions, such as the IT industry or the retailing sector. Therefore, 
taking into consideration the results obtained in this study, we conclude that, in spite of the measures 
being put in place by regulators, MNCs are still carrying out activities of profit shifting. We therefore 
recommend that expedited action be taken to implement the Directive on the disclosure of income 
tax information, which would in effect require MNCs operating in the EU to draw up and disclose to 
the public income tax information, including a total breakdown of the profits made, revenues, taxes, 
and employees.
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